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ABSTRACT 
The increasing availability and deployment of open source 
software in personal and commercial environments makes open 
source software highly appealing for hackers, and others who are 
interested in exploiting software vulnerabilities. This deployment 
has resulted in a debate “full of religion” on the security of open 
source software compared to that of closed source software. 
However, beyond such arguments, only little quantitative analysis 
on this research issue has taken place. We discuss the state-of-the-
art of the security debate and identify shortcomings. Based on 
these, we propose new metrics, which allows to answer the 
question to what extent the review process of open source and 
closed source development has helped to fix vulnerabilities. We 
illustrate the application of some of these metrics in a case study 
on OpenOffice (open source software) vs. Microsoft Office 
(closed source software).   
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2.8 [Software Engineering]: Metrics – product metrics, 
process metrics 
General Terms 
Measurement, Security 
Keywords 
Open source software, Closed source software, Security, Metrics 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last few decades we have got used to acquiring software 
by procuring licenses for a proprietary, or binary-only, immaterial 
“object”. We have, then, come to regard software as a good we 
have to pay for – be it for either personal or commercial use – just 
as we would pay for material objects, such as electronic devices, 
or food. However, in more recent years, this widely cultivated 
habit has begun to be accompanied by a model, which is 
characterized by software that comes with a compilable source 
code (open source code). Often, such a source code is free of 
charge and may be modified and/or redistributed. The family of 
software of this kind is referred to as the umbrella term “open 
source software”. When discussing this alleged innovation in 
software distribution, we are reminded by Glass [10] that, 
essentially, free and open source software dates right back to the 
origins of the computing field, as far back in fact as the 1950s, 
when all software was free, and most of it open. 
The current application fields of open source software are 
manifold. Internet programs, such as the mail transfer agent 
Sendmail, the Web server Apache, the operating system Linux, 
the database MySQL, and the office package OpenOffice are 
some of the most popular examples. Comprehensive repositories 
for open source applications, which are already successfully 
competing with today‟s binary-only software (closed source 
software), are provided by the open source software development 
websites http://sourceforge.net and http://freshmeat.net, the latter 
maintaining a large index of Unix and cross-platform software. 
The increasing availability and deployment of open source 
software in personal and commercial environments makes open 
source software appealing for hackers, and others who are 
interested in exploiting software vulnerabilities. These security 
flaws become even more dangerous when software is not applied 
in a closed context, but interconnected with other systems and the 
Internet (this argument is also valid for closed source software). 
Naraine [22] reports a study by The Mitre Corp., according to 
which there are more than 230 open source software packages 
already in use, even for critical operations, within U.S. federal 
government agencies and departments. In order to appropriately 
tackle security concerns regarding the applied packages, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security initiated the so-called 
Vulnerability Discovery and Remediation, Open Source 
Hardening Project, which was part of a broad federal initiative to 
perform daily security audits of approximately 40 open-source 
applications, including Linux, Apache, and MySQL. All these 
developments show that open source software has definitely 
arrived in the world of important and critical software 
environments that need security protection against attacks. 
Interestingly, Li et al. [19] find that the portion of security 
vulnerabilities related to the total bugs fixed has even increased in 
both software “Mozilla” and “Apache”. The discussion on open 
source security becomes even more relevant when open source 
software packages are themselves deployed as security 
instruments, such as virus scanners, intrusion detection systems, 
password safes or “single sign-on” systems [4]. However, the 
discussion of whether obscurity outperforms tranparency in terms 
 
 
of security is as old as the frequently referenced work of 
Kerckhoffs [15]. 
Picking up the discourse on comparing the security of open source 
software with that of closed source, one might argue that the 
former is inherently more secure due to its communal writing and 
review process. On the other hand, Fisher [7] reminds us that, in 
2002, researchers found several vulnerabilities in the open source 
software “OpenSSL toolkit”, all of which were buffer overruns – 
the most common and preventable flaws in software. Developers 
can also place back doors in open source software deliberately. 
Although there is a plethora of articles in the popular on-line 
press, the observation of Payne [26] that there has been little 
discussion of this in the academic literature is still valid. 
Frequently, discussions and arguments are polarizing, and we 
believe that Herbert Thompson hit the mark when saying “When 
folks talk about Linux and Windows security, a lot of religion gets 
involved.” ([21], p. 27). Furthermore, we also need to consider 
that a security validation might be biased depending on the 
person, role or organization that performs the security analysis. 
For example, Messmer [21] reports that Security Innovation 
caused an uproar when it asserted in a study that a Web server 
based on open source code had twice as many security 
vulnerabilities recorded for it in 2004 as a comparable Microsoft-
based Web server did. According to Messmer, this study was 
financed by Microsoft. 
An unbiased discussion of open source and closed source security 
is necessary for a validation of the arguments of both open source 
advocates and closed source advocates. More specifically, we 
should not primarily address the question of whether open source 
or closed source software is securer, but should rather focus on the 
conditions under which open source development and closed 
source development contribute to enhanced security, in order to 
give hints about the reasons for flaws, and on how to prevent them 
in the future. For example, Li et al. [19] empirically find for 
Mozilla and Apache that, against the belief that buffer overflows 
are the most common form of security vulnerabilities, semantic 
bugs cause more than 70% of vulnerabilities. 
Summing up, it is helpful, if not necessary, to transparently 
measure and rate the security of software – be it open source or 
closed source software [33]. As Bellovin [5], p. 96, quotes Lord 
Kelvin, “If you can not measure it, you can not improve it.” 
However, measuring security is a challenging task, because 
security is somehow invisible: the more secure a system is, the 
less uproar occurs. Despite an increasing number of quantitative 
research papers on measuring software security in the past years, 
it is still true what Witten et al. [32], observed in 2001: what the 
discussion on software security specifically lacks is appropriate 
metrics, methodology and hard data. 
This paper addresses this research gap and contributes to the 
quantification of (open source and closed source) software 
security by (a) analyzing limitations of metrics and models 
defined in previous research, (b) proposing new metrics, which 
measures to what extent the review process of open source and 
closed source development has helped to fix vulnerabilities, and 
(c) applying the metrics in a case study on OpenOffice (open 
source software) vs. Microsoft Office (closed source software). 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we 
provide an overview of the recent discussion. Then, in Section 3, 
we analyze models proposed in the literature. Section 4 presents 
and discusses the new metric. The data used for the application of 
the proposed metric in the case study are presented in Section 5. 
Section 6 provides our empirical results, before we conclude. 
2. RECENT DISCUSSION 
The discussion on open source and closed source software is 
affected by the presence of several different understandings. It 
becomes even more unclear when several open source licenses are 
mentioned, or further notions, such as “free software”, pop up. 
However, (not only) in the context of the impacts of software 
models on security, does it seem reasonable to precisely define 
what open source software is and whether we can identify several 
categories which need to be treated differently in the security 
context. Therefore, we briefly clarify these issues. This also helps 
us to unfold and discuss the security arguments in favor of and 
against open source software before we present proposed models 
and empirical findings on measuring software security. 
2.1 Terms and Definitions 
In any of the understandings the authors are aware of, the 
availability of source code to the public is a precondition for 
software being denoted as “open source software”. Beyond this 
requirement, the Open Source Initiative (OSI) has defined a set of 
criteria that software has to comply with [25]. The definition 
particularly includes permission to modify the code and to 
redistribute it. However, it does not govern the software 
development process in terms of who is eligible to modify the 
original version. For example, one option would be to allow 
anyone to include source code and to upload it to the software 
repository (this style of development is referred to as “bazaar 
style” by Raymond [27], another would be to supervise the 
modification process by leaving the integration of modification 
proposals up to “wizards”; this traditional, hierarchical 
development style is denoted as “cathedral” by Raymond [27]. 
The implementation of this modification procedure might have an 
impact on the security of the software, so that a detailed 
discussion of open source security would need to consider this 
issue. Summing up, it is important to distinguish between “the 
product” open source software and its development process. With 
regard to the latter, we focus on the implementation phase and do 
not regard other phases in the software development process.   
A plethora of OSD-compliant licenses have come into operation, 
such as the Apache License, BSD license, and GNU General 
Public License (GPL), which is maintained by the Free Software 
Foundation (FSF). The FSF [9] provides a definition of “ „free 
software’ [as] a matter of liberty, not price.” In contrast to the 
OSD definition, the FSF explicitly focuses on the option of 
releasing the improvements to the public (freedom 3), thereby 
rejecting a strong supervision of the modification process. More 
specifically, the definition says: “If you do publish your changes, 
you should not be required to notify anyone in particular, or in 
any particular way.” Similar to the discussion of what open or 
free software is, we need to define what “closed software” is. 
Does it comprise all that software that is non-open in a particular 
context, or does it simply mean that software is distributed in a 
binary-only form? It might be useful in the context of security 
evaluation to further specify different types of “closed” software. 
The categorization of software and its development process as 
“open source software (development)” or “free software 
(development)” in contrast to “closed source software 
(development)” reflects approaches through the developer‟s lens 
and specifies the type of development. Complementarily, one 
could also adopt a software user‟s point of view by differentiating 
between software that needs to be paid for and software for which 
no fee applies. This dimension takes the pricing model into 
account. The resulting classification scheme corresponds to a two-
dimensional matrix, which is illustrated (with real-world 
examples) in Table 1. 
Table 1. Classification of software 
 Open source Closed source 
Free of 
charge 
Linux, Apache 
Web server 
Adobe Acrobart Reader 
Subject to 
charge 
MySQL MS Windows OS 
2.2 The Debate on Open Source Security 
In the debate on the security of open source and closed source 
software, a set of arguments is repeatedly presented. We present 
and discuss those arguments that seem to arise most frequently.  
While there is consensus that opening source code to the public 
increases the potential number of reviewers, its impact on finding 
security flaws is controversially debated. Proponents of open 
source software stress the strength of the resulting peer review 
process [26] and argue in the sense of Raymond [27] that, “Given 
enough eyeballs, bugs are shallow.” (p. 19). This strength of the 
review process is assumed to make finding bugs easier and more 
likely. Beside the argument of an increased number of reviewers, 
proponents also claim that, for each reviewer, vulnerabilities in 
closed source software are harder to find than those in software 
whose source code is readable. However, opponents comment that 
only techniques differ ([27], p. 67f). For example, closed source 
software can be disassembled. They further worry that open 
source code might attract skilled programmers who are actively 
seeking flaws but who eschew any efforts to find flaws in closed 
source software. In this context, source code of new software 
(version), which has not been inspected by many reviewers, is 
assumed to be particularly endangered.  
Interestingly, both parties essentially agree that open source 
basically makes it easy to find vulnerabilities; they only differ in 
their conclusions with regard to the resulting impact on security. 
With regard to the availability of an increased number of 
reviewers, it is countered that not all reviewers tend to have 
similar experience and expertise. In contrast, experienced 
reviewers in companies are believed to be even better skilled in 
finding flaws. The reason for this bias is that often reviewers do 
not only need to know programming languages but also need to 
have further skills, such as network or cryptographic skills. For 
example, Payne [26] mentions a vulnerability found in some 
implementations of the Secure Shell remote login system protocol 
version 1.5. Finding this vulnerability required not only an 
understanding of the protocol itself, but also of advanced issues 
relating to cryptology. Furthermore, it is queried whether the 
actual number or reviewers is really as high as assumed: Levy 
[18] remarks “Sure, the source code is available. But is anyone 
reading it?”, and Viega [31] guesses that many potential 
reviewers do not inspect the code because they believe that others 
have already done so. Summarizing, advocates of closed source 
software believe that the closeness of software, which follows the 
principle “security by obscurity”, allows security flaws to be 
hidden, at least until a patch is publicly available [8]. The authors 
doubt that this argument is a strong one, since it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to hide the source code during the time the software is 
in operation. A salient example is the accidentally published 
source code of Diebold voting machines on the Internet in 2003 
[29]. This source code had been used by voting machines in 37 
states of the U.S. Although this source code was certainly 
involved in critical operations, it was published, even without any 
criminal efforts being necessary. While this source code was 
readable for anybody, vulnerabilities could also be detected by 
scientists, which initiated a public debate. However, in cases 
where a source code is only available to a few criminals, code 
hiding may even be counterproductive [8]. 
With regard to the detection of security flaws in software, it 
should be equitably noted that not all vulnerabilities are revealed 
by the source code, be it open or closed. Some flaws might be due 
to design decisions, but documentations on design are not always 
available. Other vulnerabilities can infiltrate software if the 
compiler used to generate binary code is insidiously modified. In 
this case, the source code does not reveal these vulnerabilities. 
Thompson [30] demonstrates this principle with C code examples, 
where even the source code of the compiler does not disclose any 
malicious elements, although these are integrated into the binary 
version of this compiler.  
Payne [26] argues that security flaws in open source software can 
be fixed more quickly than those of closed source software, 
because the user community is not dependent on a company‟s 
schedule to release a patch. It can rather control the activities to 
fix vulnerabilities by itself. However, Payne [26] also notes that 
the impact of the availability of source code on security might 
also depend on the open source model used. For example, the 
(open source) cathedral model would allow essentially anyone to 
detect vulnerabilities, but not to remove them, because the 
patching process is regulated and needs time, which can then be 
used by attackers to exploit the (unpatched) vulnerabilities.  
The discussion on security presented above involves a lot of 
“religion“[21] and is also characterized by general attitudes 
towards open source and closed source software. However, in 
order to enlighten the impact of open source on security, we 
propose the application of measurements, which allow for a fair 
comparison of open source and closed source software. In the next 
section, we discuss metrics that have been proposed in the 
literature and that would support such measurements. 
3. REVIEW: QUANTITATIVE MODELS 
In the literature, a number of quantitative models for the 
measurement of security of software systems have been proposed. 
These models have often be related to reliability and 
dependability in terms of nomenclature and methodologies [12, 
13, 16]. In this section we briefly present the most important 
security-related models, focussing on security breaches and 
vulnerabilities. Models that address the economics of disclosing 
vulnerabilities (see, for example, [23, 28]), are beyond the scope 
of our work. Finally, we identify the need for further research by 
summarizing the drawbacks and limitations of existing models 
and metrics. 
Security breaches are incidents, which are due to security 
vulnerabilities. Adopting a quantitative model of reliability, 
Littlewood et al. [20] and Kimura [16] use a probabilistic model 
for the empirical security of software by representing the 
cumulative number of security breaches as a function with the 
elapsed time as an independent variable. The model assumes the 
random variable time up to the next intrusion to be exponentially 
distributed. However, the authors make no assumptions on the 
development of the rate parameter λ.  
In cases where the total effort in finding vulnerabilities is not 
linear in time, for example due to a changing number of reviewers 
with different skills, the elapsed time as the independent variable 
seems inappropriate and would need to be substituted by the total 
effort [20]. Another modification of the basic model refers to 
evaluating the security breaches by considering the cumulative 
reward gained by the attackers. Jonsson and Olovsson [13] 
perform a practical intrusion test on a distributed UNIX computer 
system and collect data related to the difficulty of causing security 
breaches. On the basis of these data, they formulate the hypothesis 
that the occurrence of security breaches can be split into three 
phases based on the attackers‟ behavior: the learning phase, the 
standard attack phase, and the innovative attack phase. They 
further find statistical evidence that the times between consecutive 
breaches during the standard attack phase are exponentially 
distributed with a constant rate parameter λ using the 
(independent) variable attacking worker time. Thus, their findings 
support the (homogeneous) model of Littlewood et. al [20]. 
Similar to the observations of Johnsson and Olovsson [13] 
regarding the development of security breaches, Alhazmi et al. [2, 
3] assume that the development of vulnerability discovery, which 
is a precondition for any intentionally induced security breach, 
can be split up into three different phases, in which the usage 
environment and vulnerability detection effort change. In phase 1, 
the software testers gather sufficient knowledge of the system to 
break into it successfully. In phase 2, the discovering of 
vulnerabilities will be most rewarding for both white hat and 
black hat finders. Finally, in phase 3, the vulnerability detection 
effort will then start shifting to the succeeding version of the 
software. These phases form an “S” shape that is assumed to 
follow the principle that the vulnerability discovery rate is linear 
in both the momentum gained by the market acceptance of the 
product and in the saturation due to a finite number of 
vulnerabilities. Let y(t) be the total number of vulnerabilities 
found in period [0,t], A a constant of proportionality, and B the 
total number of vulnerabilities that would eventually be found in 
the software, then Alhazmi et al. (2005) consequently assume the 
vulnerability discovery rate to be given by the differential 
equation )( yBAy
dt
dy , resulting in 
1
ABt
BCe
B
y . Using 
data for both commercial (five versions of Windows) and open-
source systems (two versions of Red Hat Linux ), Alhazmi et al. 
[2] find statistical evidence for their model for both closed source 
software and open source software. Interestingly, following the 
assumption of the model that the total number of eventually found 
vulnerabilities is given by B, it provides a procedure for 
determining B and, thereby, for determining the number of still 
undetected vulnerabilities. Comparing their figures of B (rounded 
up) with the current numbers on detected vulnerabilities 
(bracketed), as provided by the U.S. National Vulnerability 
Database Version 2.0, we get these figures: Windows 95: B=49 
(46), Windows 98: B=66 (91), Windows XP: B=88 (257), 
Windows NT: 153 (234), Windows 2000: 163 (345), Red Hat 
Linux 6.2: 123 (64), and Red Hat Linux 7.1: 163 (36). The gaps 
between predicted and current figures show that the number of 
detected vulnerabilities of some systems are strongly 
underestimated in the model of Alhazmi et al. [2]. Therefore, their 
model needs to be re-evaluated with particular regard to 
approximating the development of detected vulnerabilities in 
phase 3. 
As mentioned above, time-based models become inappropriate 
when the total effort that is spent on detecting vulnerabilities is 
not linear in time. A model that considers this issue is presented 
by Alhazmi and Malaiya [1], who assume the effort to detect 
vulnerabilities of a software system to depend upon the number of 
computers on which the particular software is installed. More 
specifically, they define the effort E as E (Ui
i 0
n
Pi) , 
where Ui is the total number of users of all systems at the period 
of time I, and Pi is the percentage of the users using the system. 
They further assume, in analogy to their time-based model [2], 
that the vulnerability detection rate is proportional to the fraction 
of remaining vulnerability. On the basis of these assumptions, 
they hypothesize that the number of vulnerabilities is given by 
y B(1 e vuE ) , where vu is a parameter and B represents 
the number of vulnerabilities that would eventually be found. 
They find statistical evidence for the validity of this effort-based 
model for the operating systems Windows 98 and NT 4.0. 
Like Littlewood et al. [20], Rescorla [28] adopts a model provided 
by the literature on software reliability. More specifically, he uses 
the probabilistic G-O model presented by Goel and Okumoto [11], 
which models the number of vulnerabilities over time with a non-
homogenous Poisson process. This model assumes the expected 
value of the Poisson process to be proportional to the number of 
undiscovered vulnerabilities at time t. The model also assumes 
that all vulnerabilities will eventually be found. On the basis of 
the non-homogenous Poisson process that the G-O model 
features, Rescorla [28] fits an exponential of the form 
/tAe  to 
the curve of vulnerability. Then, the total number of 
vulnerabilities N can be computed by AN , where A is a 
constant. 
However, in his empirical analysis of vulnerabilities of (both open 
source and closed source) operating systems, namely Windows 
NT 4.0, Solaris 2.5.1, FreeBSD 4.0 and RedHat Linux 7.0, 
Rescorla [28] finds no (strong) statistical evidence that the G-O 
model appropriately approximates the number of detected 
vulnerabilities over time. 
Having reviewed the literature on the quantitative security 
analysis in the context of “open source versus closed source 
software”, we can identify the following problems and limitations: 
 There is only little literature on measuring software. Those 
metrics and models that have been applied to security are 
mostly adopted from the research field of reliability. 
Particularly, to the knowledge of the authors, no models have 
been developed that address the discourse on open source 
versus closed source security. There is a strong need for the 
development of metrics and models dedicated to measuring and 
comparing software security. 
 The set of empirical investigations is small and mainly focuses 
on the analysis of operating systems. We assume that these 
limitations are strongly related to the scarcity of security data. 
 Beside the problem of data scarcity, many authors struggle with 
the availability and quality of data, particularly in terms of 
incompleteness and a low level of granularity. 
 Up to now, software security has been addressed like an 
“atom”. Only very few authors split it up into components. 
Particularly in the context of security assessment of open 
source development versus closed source development, it seems 
reasonable to zoom in on the “bundle security assessment” to 
analyze the extent to which elements of security are supported 
by these different types of software development. One option 
would be to follow Payne‟s [26] path by separately considering 
security requirements, such as availability and confidentiality. 
However, we propose the following of a more software-
technological dimension, which differentiates according to the 
type of vulnerability source. For example, vulnerabilities can 
occur due to software design, due to implementation faults, 
such as buffer overflows, or due to software environment 
problems, such as the usage of faulty libraries or operating 
system calls. By employing this classification, we would be 
able to assess the appropriateness of the software development 
type with regard to security (maintenance) in more detail. 
 An assumption of many models is the finite number of 
vulnerabilities that a software features or that are detected over 
the software‟s lifetime. This assumption needs to be scrutinized 
when we accept the option that patches not only eradicate 
vulnerabilities, but also create new ones. 
 Most existing models on security measurement are related to 
the number of detected vulnerabilities or exploitations. 
However, this is only one aspect of the quantification of 
software security, which needs to be complemented by further 
evaluations. For example, the assessment of the severity of 
vulnerabilities is no less important. 
 The demand for developing models that address software 
security has led the security measurement community 
underemphasizing the discussion of metrics to be used in the 
models. 
The next section addresses the challenge of quantifying software 
security by proposing a new metric that allows to measure to what 
extent the review process of open source and closed source 
development has helped to fix vulnerabilities. 
4. NEW SECURITY METRICS 
As vulnerabilities are the root of exploitations and security 
breaches, the measurement of vulnerabilities is the right point at 
which to start quantifying software. However, the number of 
vulnerabilities does not necessarily reflect the level of security of 
a program. For example, if program A features only one 
vulnerability that is easy to discover, can be exploited 
systematically and causes severe damage, then A can be felt to be 
less secure than a program B that features ten vulnerabilities, each 
of them being extremely hard to discover, can be exploited only in 
the presence of specific conjunctures, and does not cause any 
severe harm. Therefore, we propose weighting vulnerabilities. Let 
n be the number of vulnerabilities in time window [0;t] and vsi, 
i=1..n, be the (normalized) severity of vulnerability i with 
]1;0[ivs . Then, the cumulated weighted vulnerability 
CWV(t) in time window [0;t] is calculated by summing up all vsi, 
i.e. 
)(
1
)(
tn
i i
vstCWV . A practical example for the “severity 
of vulnerabilty” concept  is the NIST Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System (CVSS), which assigns a (aggregated) score 
between 0 and 10 to each vulnerability (normalization is 
straightforward here). If we further categorize the vulnerabilities 
according to their type j, such as “buffer overflow” or “faulty 
library”, we can compute type-specific CWVs by 
)(
1
)(
tn
i iijj
vstCWV  with 1ij , if vulnerability i 
belongs to type j and 0ij  else. 
This segregation of vulnerabilities according to their type allows 
us to identify the most critical (types of) security defects, so that 
we can discuss the impact of open source and closed source 
development on security broken down into defect types. We 
would like to stress that the categorization of vulnerabilities can 
occur along different dimensions; for example, it can be based on 
the type (buffer overflows, cross-site scripting etc.) that cause 
vulnerabilities, but also on the resulting impact (violation of 
integrity, confidentiality etc.) of intrusions or on the impact on 
business value [6]. In the literature, mainly the first option is 
adopted, but we also find it interesting to discuss the other paths; 
however, this discourse is out of scope of this paper. 
However, the availability of scores and the resulting opportunity 
to derive conclusions on a metric scale level is dangerous, when 
scores were improperly determined on the basis of ordinal 
rankings, thereby reflecting only a seemingly accuracy. The 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System Version 2 Calculator, 
which is applied in the CVSS, implements such a misleading 
procedure. A way out of this problem would be to remain on 
ordinal level by providing vulnerability severity classes (for 
example low, medium, high) and to simply count the 
vulnerabilities for each class without aggregating the numbers. 
We, then, obtain the cumulated unweighted vulnerability CUVk(t), 
with k being the severity class, by  
)(
1
)(
tn
i ik
k tCUV  with 
1ik , if vulnerability i belongs to severity class k and 
0ik  else. Analogously to the calculation of CWV, we can 
also determine CUVk specific to vulnerability type j (for example 
buffer overflow) by 
)(
1
)(
tn
i ijk
k
j tCUV  with 1ijk , if 
vulnerability i belongs to severity class k and to vulnerability type 
j, and 0ijk  else. 
However, we still need to carefully observe the procedure with 
which classes are used. For example, the NIST National 
Vulnerability Database does not only provide a score for each 
vulnerability, but also a vulnerability class/ranking. 
Unfortunately, “[…] these qualitative rankings are simply 
mapped from the numeric CVSS scores” 
(http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm). 
The metrics discussed so far relate to the vulnerabilities that have 
been revealed during the process of reviewing software. However, 
they do not consider the extent to which the review process has 
helped to fix the vulnerabilities. As this issue is particularly 
relevant to the discussion of whether open source software or 
closed source software is more secure in practice, we now address 
it in more detail. 
With regard to the elimination of vulnerabilities by the provision 
of (security) patches, it seems less reasonable to measure the 
number or intensity of patches, because this provides no 
information on the number of covered vulnerabilities or on the 
ages of covered vulnerabilities. It seems rather appropriate to 
compute (statistical data on) the reaction time between detection 
and elimination of a vulnerability, weighted by the level of 
severity of the vulnerability. It might also seem reasonable to 
record how many of the detected vulnerabilities are unpatched: 
Let i be the index of the event that a vulnerability is either 
announced or patched, ti be the corresponding point of time, 
it
pv  
be the (possibly severity-weighted) number of detected and 
patched vulnerabilities in the time window [0;ti], and let 
it
uv   be 
the corresponding (possibly severity-weighted) number of 
unpatched vulnerabilities. Then, we define the patch index at time 
tn (
nt
PI ) by 
ii
i
n
tt
t
n
i
ii
n
t
uvpv
uv
tt
t
PI
1
1
1 )(
1 . 
The sum corresponds to the shaded area in Figure 1, the quotient 
1/tn normalizes ].1;0[
nt
PI  It should be noted that t1 corresponds 
to the point in time where the first vulnerability is detected. 
Because of the normalization being inherent in PI , PI=0 would 
imply that, for all announced vulnerabilities, a patch is already 
provided at the day of announcement. In contrast, PI=1 would 
imply that none of the announced vulnerabilities has been 
patched. 
 
Figure 1. Visualization of patch index (PI) 
It should also be noted that the proposed patch index does not 
reflect a security level at a specific point of time, but rather 
mirrors the level of community patching activities with regard to 
both the number of unpatched vulnerabilities in relation to all 
vulnerabilities and the time having been consumed for fixing; 
therefore, the patch index is relative in nature. At the beginning, 
the level does not provide any valuable data, but it becomes a 
significant factor after some time has gone by and several 
vulnerabilities have been detected. However, the proposed patch 
index is time-invariant what needs to be discussed or modified in 
future research: 
 The shaded rectangles in Figure 1 are considered regardless of 
their horizontal position. This issue might lead to 
overemphasizing the meaning of early (unpatched) 
vulnerabilities, particularly when the sizes of consecutive 
rectangles are comparably small. 
 The treatment of exposed vulnerabilities is time-invariant in 
that the patch index does not consider whether the exposed 
vulnerabilities were just recently announced or whether they are 
already known for a long time. 
5. DATA 
In order to exemplify and apply the proposed patch index, we 
apply it to data gained for the closed source software “Microsoft 
Office” (considering only Word, PowerPoint and Excel and 
starting with the version released in 2002) and the open source 
software “OpenOffice” (excluding the database program 
introduced in version 2.0) for the period from 1 October 2001 to 
11 March 2008. The reasons for choosing these software bundles 
are rooted in the fact that (1) they provide essentially the same 
functionality, (2) comprehensive security data is available, and (3) 
they are well-known in the software (security) community. 
We consider only those vulnerabilities that have been accepted as 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) entries by the 
CVE editorial board, which was itself created by the MITRE 
corporation (http://cve.mitre.org). Each of these vulnerabilities 
has a unique identifier, e.g. CVE-1999-0067, which is used as a 
reference in many other vulnerability databases 
(http://cve.mitre.org/compatible/vulnerability_management.html). 
Among these databases, we use one of the most comprehensive, 
the NIST “National Vulnerabilty Database” (http://nvd.nist.gov/), 
which provides full CVE database functionality and offers 
sophisticated search options. We obtain further details of the 
vulnerabilities from the MITRE website, the US-CERT 
Vulnerability Notes Database, Microsoft Security Bulletins, 
OpenOffice.org and “The Open Source Vulnerability Database” 
(http://osvdb.org). 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We first address the number of vulnerabilities found for each 
software. Table 2 shows the numbers, categorized according to 
their severity. The table entries correspond to what, in Subsection 
“Security vulnerabilities”, is referred to as “cumulated unweighted 
vulnerability CUVk“, with k being the severity class. The severity 
score follows the NIST Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS), the categorization of types also follows NIST, which 
adopts a subset of the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) 
list that provides a comprehensive categorization of vulnerability 
types and is maintained by the MITRE corporation. 
The central findings regarding the announced vulnerabilities are: 
 MS Office has attracted about 7 times more vulnerabilities than 
OpenOffice has. However, we have to consider that probably 
more vulnerabilities in OpenOffice than in MS Office might 
have been existed, detected, potentially discussed in forums, 
and finally removed, before they could have become a CVE 
vulnerability. 
 Both software bundles have suffered only minor low-severity 
vulnerabilities; medium- and high-severity vulnerabilities have 
occurred almost equally often. 
Table 2. Number of vulnerabilities (CUVk) of 
MS Office (M) and OpenOffice (O) 
Vulnerability severity class k 
Sum Low 
(0-3.9) 
Medium 
(4.0-6.9) 
High 
(7.0-10.0) 
M O M O M O M O 
3 2 50 6 55 8 108 16 
 
Having analyzed the announced vulnerabilities, we now address 
the question of the extent to which the review process of open 
source development has helped to fix vulnerabilities. For this 
purpose, we apply the patch index, as defined in Section 4. We do 
not apply any weighting of vulnerabilities, because CVE data are 
essentially on ordinal scale level, as discussed in Subsection 4. 
Figure 2 shows the development of the patch index for both 
software bundles. 
Figure 2. Patch indices of MS Office and OpenOffice 
 
Both curves feature a strong decrease at the onset, before leveling 
off. The strong decrease of both curves is due to the fact that, in 
the beginning, the presence of unpatched vulnerabilities is 
“overemphasized”, as the total number of vulnerabilities is low. In 
order to weaken this early impact on the overall development of 
the patch index, it might be reasonable to integrate some kind of 
“weighting vulnerabilities” in future work. 
Interestingly, although the total numbers of vulnerabilities found 
in MS Office is about 7 times higher than the OpenOffice-related 
number, the (levelled off) patch index of MS Office does not 
reveal a comparably weak performance in patching 
vulnerabilities. With regard to MS Office, on average, about 27% 
of all announced vulnerabilities have not been patched, the 
corresponding value of OpenOffice is 18%. However, these 
results do not necessarily mean that MS Office vulnerabilities are 
slower patched than those of OpenOffice. By contrast, a simple 
statistical analysis of patch times reveals that, on average, MS 
Office vulnerabilities (the median is 67.5 days, the mean is 87 
days) are more quickly patched than OpenOffice vulnerabilities 
(the median is 85 days, the mean is about 87.4 days). The reasons 
for these divergent results are that (1) the patch index is invariant 
in which vulnerability is patched and (2) the patch index also 
considers both the total number of vulnerabilities detected and the 
total number of vulnerabilities patched. Interestingly, in the period 
under consideration, the overall proportions of unpatched 
vulnerabilities are almost equal (MS Office: 14/108 ≈ 13%, 
OpenOffice: 2/16 = 12.5%). 
This investigation demonstrates that – in contrast to statistical data 
about patch times – the proposed patch index is capable of 
considering both the extent to which a certain type of software 
development creates vulnerabilities and removes vulnerabilities. 
Therefore, the patch index represents a metric that allows for 
comprehensively measuring and comparing practical software 
security. However, the observed patch times need to be 
interpreted very carefully for two reasons: (1) Data refer to one 
investigation only. (2) Patch times for both closed and open 
source development heavily depend on the concrete patching 
procedures in the responsible organizations or communities. 
Therefore, it would be necessary to consider whether the 
particular open source software development is realized in bazaar 
or in cathedral style (according to OpenOffice.org [24], cathedral 
style seems to dominate the development of OpenOffice). 
7. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK 
Discussions in the literature show that the increasing availability 
and the deployment of open source software in personal and 
commercial environments has resulted in a debate “full of 
religion” on the security of open source software compared to that 
of closed source software. This debate reveals the much more 
comprehensive problem of assessing security, which has 
traditionally only rarely been conducted on a quantitative level. 
Although some methods and metrics have been proposed and 
applied in empirical research, the methodology is at an early stage 
and is mainly adopted from the fields of reliability and 
dependability, without careful investigation into the extent to 
which it can be adopted or the question of whether new models 
and metrics are required. For example, one assumption of some 
models is the finite number of vulnerabilities that software 
features or that are detected over the software‟s lifetime. This 
assumption needs to be scrutinized when we accept the option that 
patches not only eradicate vulnerabilities, but also create new 
ones. Furthermore, most existing models on security measurement 
are related to the number of detected vulnerabilities or 
exploitations. However, it is only one aspect of the quantification 
of software security. For example, the assessment of the severity 
of vulnerabilities is no less important. Beyond the problems 
related to the scarcity of appropriate models, we also face the crux 
that the set of empirical investigations is small and mainly focused 
on the analysis of operating systems. We assume that these 
limitations are strongly related to the scarcity of security data. 
This paper starts to bridge the sketched gaps by proposing metrics 
that allow for quantitatively comparing software development 
styles with regard to resulting security. The application of the 
proposed metrics, for which reliable data are available, shows 
that, overall, OpenOffice has been more secure than MS Office in 
terms of vulnerabilities. We suggest refining the metrics and 
extending the analysis onto more software bundles. A further step 
beyond such activities would be automated security evaluation, 
which enables us to continuously monitor (the development of) 
software security and, particularly, to empirically answer the 
question of when, and to what extent, which software 
development style leads to more secure software. More 
specifically, we find it appropriate to analyze which vulnerability 
types (with regard to their roots) are best addressed by which 
software development style. We would then try to group software 
into components, each of which is homogeneous in the roots of 
potential vulnerabilities. For example, all input validation tasks 
could be integrated in an I/O module. This module would then be 
developed according to the development style that best addresses 
the roots of such vulnerabilities. It should be noticed that the 
categorization of vulnerabilities does not necessarily needs to be 
done along the roots of vulnerabilities. It can also occur along the 
resulting impact (violation of integrity, confidentiality etc.) of 
intrusions or along the impact on business value [6]. 
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